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THE UNIFORM TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT-NEW
AND IMPROVED, BUT SHORTCOMINGS STILL EXIST
Thomas E. Allison*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws proposed the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.' The
prefatory note promulgated by the Conference2 describes the Act as a
revision and restatement of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, which
was originally proposed by the Conference in 1956 and then revised in
1966. 3 The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was in turn developed from
the Model Gifts of Securities to Minors Act, sponsored by the New
York Stock Exchange and the Association of Stock Exchange Firms
to promote inter vivos gifts of securities to minors.' To describe the
Act as a revision and restatement, however, may not do it justice.
The new Act so significantly expands the scope and overall utility of
the old law that it should be treated as a major change in the area of
transferring property to minors.
The new Act is rapidly gaining acceptance by many state legisla-
tures. Every state, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
adopted a version of either the 1956 or the 1966 Uniform Gift to Mi-
nors Act.' The New Act has been adopted by twenty-six states, in-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.S. (Engineering),
Tulane University, 1973; M.B.A. (Finance), Florida State University, 1974; J.D., Stetson Col-
lege of Law, 1977; LL.M. (Taxation), University of Florida, 1978.
1. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT (UTMA), 8A U.L.A. 153 (Supp. 1987).
2. Id. at 153-54.
3. UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT (1956 UGMA), 8A U.L.A. 405 (1983); UNIF. GIFTS TO
MINORS ACT (1966 UGMA), 8A U.L.A. 317 (1983).
4. 1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 405; Report of Subcommittee on Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act, 103 TR. & EST. 983, at 991-92 (October, 1964) thereinafter Report]. The
Model Act was also referred to as the "Uniform Gifts of Securities to Minors Act." For a
discussion of the operation of the Model Act, see Moore, Uniform Gifts of Securities to Minors
Act: A Consideration of its Merits, 33 U. DET. L.J. 298 (1956); Note, Recent Legislation to
Facilitate Gifts of Securities to Minors, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1476, 1481-82 (1956).
5. Reference is made herein to those jurisdictions in which these statutes have since been
repealed as the enacting jurisdictions adopted the UTMA. See infra note 6 for citations to the
UTMA adoptions in these jurisdictions. The codifications of the UGMA versions are as fol-
lows: ALA. CODE §§ 35-5-1 to -10 (1975) (repealed 1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.60.011-.101
(1980 & Supp. 1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-2071 to -2080 (1967 & Supp. 1986); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 50-901 to -910 (1971) (repealed 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1154-1165 (West
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cluding Arkansas, California, Florida, Massachusetts, and Illinois.6
This article does not attempt to explain in detail the operation of the
1982) (repealed 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-50-101 to -112 (1973) (repealed 1984); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 45-101 to -109b (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4501-4511 (1979 & Supp.
1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-301 to -311 (1981) (repealed 1986); FLA. STAT. §§ 710.01-.10
(1983) (repealed 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-110 to -124 (1982 & Supp. 1987); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 553-1 to -9 (1976) (repealed 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 68-801 to -810 (1980) (repealed
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 201-211 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (repealed 1986); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-8-1 to -10 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 565A.1-.11
(West 1950 & Supp. 1980) (repealed 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-901 to -912 (1973 & Supp.
1979) (repealed 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 385.011-.101, 385.110-.200 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984) (repealed 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:735 to :742 (West
1965 & Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1001-1010 (1964 & Supp. 1986); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-301 to -310 (1974 & Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
201A, §§ 1-11 (Law. Co-op. 1981) (repealed 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.451-.461
(West 1967 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.01-.11 (West 1975) (repealed 1985);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-19-1 to -19 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.010-.100
(Vernon 1979) (repealed 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-26-101 to -404 (1984) (repealed
1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1001 to -1010 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 167.010-.110 (1984)
(repealed 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 463-A:1 to :10 (1983) (repealed 1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46:38-13 to -41 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-7-1 to -10 (1978 & Supp.
1984); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 7-4.1 to .13 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1987);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-68 to -77 (1984 & Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-24-01 to -10
(1978) (repealed 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1339.31-.39 (Anderson 1979) (repealed
1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 401-410, 415-419 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980) (repealed
1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.805-.880 (1984) (repealed 1985); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5301-5310 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-7-1 to -11 (1981) (repealed
1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-140 to -240 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to -39 (1980) (repealed 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-7-101 to -110
(1984 & Supp. 1987); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 141.001-.014 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-601 to -610 (1978 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3201-
3209 (1974 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-26 to -36 (1985 & Supp. 1987); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1241-1250 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.93.010 to .920 (1985); W. VA.
CODE §§ 36-7-1 to -11 (1985) (repealed 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 880.61-.71 (West 1986);
WYO. STAT. §§ 34-13-101 to -110 (1977) (repealed 1987).
6. ALA. CODE §§ 35-5A-1 to -24 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-933 to -956
(Supp. 1985); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 3900-3905 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-50-101
to -126 (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-301 to -324 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. §§ 710.101-.126
(1985 & Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 553A-1 to -24 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE
§§ 68-801 to -825 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 251-274 (Smith Hurd Supp.
1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 565B.1-.25 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1701 to -
1726 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 385.012-.252 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201A, §§ 1-24 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 527.21-.44 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.005-.094 (Vernon Supp. 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-26-501 to -803 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 167.010-.100 (1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 463-A:1 to :26 (Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-24.1-01 to -
22 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1339.31-.39 (Anderson Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1201-1226 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.805-.886 (Supp. 1987);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-7-1 to -26 (Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 55-IOA-1 to -
26 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-7-1 to -24 (Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. §§ 34-13-114 to -
137 (Supp. 1987).
340
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Uniform Acts,7 but focuses instead on the major changes made by the
new Act and the still unresolved problems in transferring property to
minors pursuant to the terms of the new Act.
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was originally conceived as a
means of providing a simple, inexpensive procedure for making life-
time gifts of securities to a minor while protecting third parties deal-
ing with the property belonging to the minor.' As an alternative to
establishing a trust or a guardianship for the benefit of the minor,9 the
scope of the original 1956 Act was expanded to include cash, annui-
ties and similar types of intangible personal property.' 0 The two ver-
sions of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act and the new Uniform
Transfers to Minors Act were generally designed to be used for rela-
tively small amounts of cash or securities, where a trust or guardian-
ship would not be cost-effective, Il but the Acts themselves contain no
7. See generally Burkhardt, Colorado Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 13 COLO. LAW.
2223 (1984) (Colorado version of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act); Downing, Minor's
Property: A Statutory Trust, 58 OKLA. B.J. 1497 (1987) (Oklahoma passage of the Uniform
Transfers to Minors Act); Eickhoff, Transfers to Minors Law, 41 J. Mo. BAR 441 (1985) (Mis-
souri passage of the Uniform Transers to Minors Act); Newman, The Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act in New York and Other Jurisdictions-Tax Consequences, Possible Abuses, and Recommen-
dations, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 18-30 (1963) (discussing the 1956 version of the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act); Report, supra note 4 (1956 version of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act);
Allison, The Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act-A Viable Alternative, 60 FLA. B.J.,
Dec. 1986, at 49 (Florida version of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act); Note, Administra-
tion of Estates; Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 16 PAC. L.J. 473 (1985) (California enact-
ment of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act).
8. 1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 405-06; 1966 UGMA prefatory note, 8A
U.L.A. at 318; Day, Stock Transfers Under Custodian Statutes, 31 CONN. B.J. 40, 41 (1957);
Moore, supra note 4, at 298-301; Newman, supra note 7, at 30-32.
9. 1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 405-06; 1966 UGMA prefatory note, 8A
U.L.A. at 318; Moore, supra note 4, at 301-06.
10. 1966 UGMA § l(e), 8A U.L.A. at 329.
11. In its Prefatory Note to the 1956 Act, the Commissioners commented on the need for
the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act by noting the alternative which existed at that time and
stating:
The net result [of these alternatives] is to discourage, if not prevent, small gifts
of securities to minors.
Regulations or statutes eliminate these complications when the subject of the
gift is a United States Savings Bond or, in many states, money deposited in a banking
institution. The Model Act seeks a similar result when the subject of the gift is a
security.
1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 406.
In adopting the 1956 UGMA, the Commissioners limited deviation from the Model Act
to items which were of a conforming nature, and items which were needed to "supply apparent
deficiencies, to meet apparently well founded objections and to conform terminology, wherever
possible, to that of other Uniform Acts." Id. at 407. These changes did not go to the underly-
ing intent in the adoption of the Uniform Act.
In its 1966 revision, the Commissioners adopted changes relating to the permitted custo-
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such restrictions. 12
The two Uniform Gifts to Minors Act versions provided that
property donated to the custodianship was considered to be owned by
the minor. 13 It is well established that any income produced by the
property is taxed to the minor unless it is used to provide for his sup-
port, in which case it is taxed to the person who is obligated to sup-
port the minor. 14 For purposes of the federal gift tax, the transfer of
the property to the custodian constitutes a completed gift upon con-
veyance, 5 with the transfer meeting the requirements for the annual
exclusion under section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.16 The
transferred property is also removed from the gross estate of the do-
nor for estate tax purposes, unless the donor serves as custodian or the
property is used to satisfy the donor's support obligation; in these
cases, the property is taxed in the donor's estate under sections 2036
dians under the Uniform Act, the nature of the property which may be the subject of a gift,
and the provisions for designating successor custodians, but these changes were intended to be
in the nature of improvements on the 1956 Act, rather than a change in purpose of the Uni-
form Act. 1966 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 321.
The Commissioners stated that the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
restates and rearranges, rather than amends, the 1966 Act. The addition of
other forms of property and other forms of dispositions made adherence to the
format and language of the prior act very unwieldy. In addition, the 1966 and
1956 Acts closely followed the language of the earlier model act, which had
already been adopted in several states, even though it did not conform to Con-
ference style. It is hoped that this rewriting and revision of UGMA will im-
prove its clarity while also expanding its coverage.
UTMA, 8A U.L.A. 153, 154 (Supp. 1987).
12. Neither the 1956 nor the 1966 versions of the UGMA nor the UTMA contain any
ceiling on the amount of property which may be held by a custodian. Therefore, even though
the uniform acts were designed to facilitate the transfer of relatively small amounts of property
to a minor, see 1956 UGMA prefatory note 8A, U.L.A. at 406, they are not restricted to this
purpose and may, in fact, hold considerable amounts of property. See Newman, Tax and
Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 446, 457-59 (1965); Report, supra
note 4, at 994-95.
13. 1956 UGMA § 3, 8A U.L.A. at 421; 1966 UGMA § 3, 8A U.L.A. at 366.
14. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23; Mahoney, The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. A
Patent Ambiguity, 34 VAND. L. REV. 495, 517-20 (1981); Newman, supra note 7, at 41; Report,
supra note 4, at 993.
15, Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449; Mahoney, supra note 14. at 516-17; Newman, supra
note 7, at 38-40; Report, supra note 4, at 991-92. For gift tax purposes, the question which
would be presented is whether the transfer of the property from the donor to the custodian
constituted the relinquishment of the donor's dominion and control. This issue is answered in
the affirmative under UGMA § 3(a) (1956, revised 1966). See supra note 13 and accompany-
ing text.
16. The donor would be entitled to the annual exclusion if he conveyed a present interest
in the property to the minor. Under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1986), this requires that the minor have
the right to the immediate use and enjoyment of the property which was the subject of the gift.
See generally R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXA-
TION 9.04 (5th ed. 1983) [hereinafter R. STEPHENS].
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and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code. 17
The tax ramifications of these donative transfers remain un-
changed under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.' 8 However,
since other types of transfers now operate to invoke the provisions of
the new Act,' 9 the tax effects of these other property transactions
under the new Act may be less obvious. Federal tax considerations
prompted some of the provisions of the new Act;20 these tax conse-
quences should always be reviewed when considering a transaction
under any of the uniform acts.
II. MAJOR CHANGES IN THE NEW ACT
Despite the Conference's characterization of the new Act as a
restatement and revision of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 2 1 the
new Act differs from the former acts in several key respects. These
differences require careful review to determine their effect on the de-
velopment of this area of the law.
A. Minority
The former acts provided that a minor was a person who had not
yet attained his twenty-first birthday.22 However, many jurisdictions
deviated from the official text and reduced this age to eighteen or
nineteen, in accordance with the general national trend for removing
the disabilities of nonage. 23  Recognizing that federal gift tax law es-
tablishes age twenty-one as the age of majority for purposes of setting
17. Prudowsky v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 890 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 62 (7th
Cir. 1972); Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 C.B. 618; R. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at 9.04(5)(c);
Mahoney, supra note 14, at 520-30; Newman, supra note 7, at 41-43; Report, supra note 4, at
992.
18. UTMA, 8A U.L.A. 153 (Supp. 1987). The provisions of the UTMA were designed to
take advantage of the terms of the Internal Revenue Code. See infra, for example, text accom-
panying notes 22-3 1. In certain situations, the income from this property may become subject
to the "Kiddie Tax" under I.R.C. § 1(i) (1986), as enacted in § 1411 of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2714 (1986).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 40-58.
20. See infra notes 22-28, 98-111 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 2.
22. 1956 UGMA § 1(k), 8A U.L.A. at 413; 1966 UGMA § 1(m), 8A U.L.A. at 330.
23. For a complete list of these changes, see 1956 UGMA, 8A U.L.A. at 414-15; 1966
UGMA, 8A U.L.A. at 332-43. In summary, the adopting jurisdictions made the following
changes relating to the age of minority: Alabama, age 19; Arizona, age 18; Arkansas, age 18
for females and age 21 for males; California, age 18; Delaware, age 18; District of Columbia,
age 18; Florida, age 18; Hawaii, age 18; Idaho, age 18; Indiana, age 18; Kansas, age 18; Ken-
tucky, age 18; Maine, age 18; Maryland, age 18; Michigan, age 18; Minnesota, age 18; Mon-
tana, age 18; Nebraska, age 19; Nevada, age 18; North Carolina, age 18; North Dakota, age 18;
South Carolina, age 18; Virginia, age 18; Washington, age 18; West Virginia, age 18; Wiscon-
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up a trust for the benefit of a minor which qualifies for the annual
exclusion,24 and realizing that custodial accounts are often used as
substitutes for formal trusts,2" the Commissioners retained age
twenty-one as the age of majority for purposes of the Act.26 They did
so despite the fact that the general age of majority for other purposes
may remain at eighteen or some other age less than age twenty-one.27
The Commissioners determined that the Act would be more useful to
donors and would more closely fit their desires if the age of required
distribution were postponed for as long as permitted under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.28 It appears that most state legislatures will accept
this determination.2 9 As explained below,3" however, the importance
of the definition of minority is somewhat diminished because the Act
may require that a custodianship terminate while the minor benefici-
ary still meets the definition of a minor under the Act.3"
B. Custodian Property
The 1966 Act restricted the types of property transferable into a
custodial account to "securities, life insurance policies, annuity con-
tracts and money," the income they produced and the proceeds from
their transfer.32 While these restrictions resulted from the historical
context of the development of the original Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act,33 many jurisdictions recognized the appropriateness of custodi-
anships holding other types of property. They accordingly expanded
the scopes of their particular versions of the uniform act to allow real
property and tangible and intangible personalty to be held in custodial
sin, age 18. The definition of minority was omitted in Massachusetts and Vermont, and de-
fined in Texas by reference to general state law for removal of the disability of minority.
24. I.R.C. § 2503(c) (1986).
25. 1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 405-06; 1966 UGMA prefatory note, 8A
U.L.A. at 318; Moore, supra note 4, at 301-06. See supra text accompanying note 9.
26. UTMA § 1(11), 8A U.L.A. at 157.
27. Id. § I comment at 158.
28. Id.
29. For a complete list of the changes to these provisions, see UTMA, 8A U.L.A. at 158-
60. In summary, the following variations in this definition were enacted among the adopting
jurisdictions: California, age 18; District of Columbia, age 18; Kentucky, age 18; Montana,
age 18; Nevada, age 18; Oklahoma, age 18; Rhode Island, age 18; South Dakota, age 18. Of
the twenty-six adopting jurisdictions, therefore, eight have changed the definition of a minor.
30. See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
32. 1966 UGMA § l(e), 8A U.L.A. at 329. This represented a liberalization of the rules
of the 1956 Act, which restricted custodial property to "securities and money," the income
which they produced and the proceeds from their sale. 1956 UGMA § l(e), 8A U.L.A. at 412-
13.
33. Newman, supra note 7, at 12; Report, supra note 4, at 983.
[Vol. 10:339
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form.3 4  The experiences in these jurisdictions, 35 and the goal of
regaining uniformity, led the Conference to redefine custodial prop-
erty to include "any interest in property" which is transferred to the
custodian, along with "the income from and proceeds of that interest
in property."36 This represents a major change in the direction of the
custodial form of ownership; anything capable of ownership may now
be held for the benefit of a minor in a custodial account under the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. This change alone can be expected
to increase the attractiveness of custodial accounts to potential do-
nors. The custodianship is a much more flexible and inexpensive de-
vice for transferring and maintaining this interest in property than are
the trust and guardianship alternatives,37 so this change should result
in more frequent use of the custodial method of property ownership.
C. Permitted Transfers and Transferors
Under the two versions of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, cus-
todial accounts could only be established by a donor in a transaction
constituting an inter vivos gift.3" This limited the utility of the old
acts, but again reflected their development from the Model Act spon-
sored by the New York Stock Exchange.39
Once again, the legislatures of several jurisdictions recognized
that only the context in which the uniform acts were developed pre-
vented a custodian of property from receiving property from other
sources. These legislatures amended their versions of the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act to expand the class of parties permitted to estab-
lish custodial accounts and the situations in which they could transfer
34. In commenting on the reasons which led to the adoption of the UTMA, the Commis-
sioners noted that
[M]any states since 1966 have substantially revised their versions of UGMA to ex-
pand the kinds of property that may he [sic] made the subject of a gift under the Act,
and a few states permit transfers to custodians from other sources, such as trusts and
estates, as well as lifetime gifts. As a result, a great deal of non-uniformity has arisen
among the states. ...
This Act follows the expansive approach taken by several states and allows any
kind of property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, to be made the subject of a
transfer to a custodian for the benefit of a minor.
UTMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 154 (citation omitted).
35. There are no reported cases reflecting litigation resulting from a jurisdiction ex-
panding the definition of custodial property beyond that contained in either version of the
UGMA.
36. UTMA § 1(6), 8A U.L.A. at 157.
37. See supra text accompanying note 11; infra text accompanying notes 83-97.
38. 1956 UGMA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 416; 1966 UGMA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 344.
39. 1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 405; Moore, supra note 4, at 298; Note,
supra note 4, at 1481-82; Report, supra note 4, at 991-92.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
property to the accounts.4" The new Act builds upon the concepts
reflected in these amendments and enlarges the classes of permitted
transfers and transferors.4 ' These changes will have little effect in
those states where prior expansion of the terms of the Gifts to Minors
Act already covered the spirit of these changes; the major impact of
the change adopted in the new Act is the anticipated return to uni-
formity in the area. The donative transfer situation encompassed by
the Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts is retained,42 but four additional
types of designations of custodianship and transfers of property are
now permitted under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.
The first additional type of designation provides that a person
having the right to designate the recipient of property upon the occur-
rence of a future event may make a revocable designation of a custo-
dian to receive such a transfer for the benefit of a minor recipient.43
Such a designation may appear in a will, a trust instrument, a deed, an
instrument exercising a power of appointment, or in a writing related
to a contract having "payable on death" provisions." This designa-
tion, since it is recovable and is not accompanied by any immediate
transfer of property to the designated custodian, creates no rights and
imposes no duties upon the designated custodian until property is ac-
tually transferred upon the occurrence of the future event.4" The
owner of a life insurance policy, for instance, is permitted under the
new Act to name a custodian for his minor child as the beneficiary of
the insurance policy.4 6 When the proceeds become payable upon the
death of the insured, if the beneficiary is still a minor then the custodi-
anship would become effective and the policy proceeds would be paid
to the custodian.
A second type provides that if specific authorization is given in
the governing instrument, a personal representative or a trustee may
transfer property to a custodian for the benefit of a minor beneficiary
40. In discussing the factors which led to the adoption of the UTMA, the Commissioners
stated that "a few states permit transfers to custodians from other sources, such as trusts and
estates, as well as lifetime gifts." UTMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 154.
41. Id. §§ 4-7 at 162-64.
42. Id. § 4 at 162. In addition to the traditional gift transfer, this section also covers "the
irrevocable exercise of a power of appointment." Id. § 4 comment at 162.
43. Id. § 3(a) at 161.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 3(c) & comment at 161. See also id. § 9 comment at 167, concerning the distinc-
tion between the irrevocable designation of a custodian and the revocable nomination of a
future custodian under UTMA § 3.
46. Id. § 3(a).
[Vol. 10:339
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of the estate or trust." Such authorization is of great use to estate
planners and should regularly be granted.48 It enables the fiduciary
having control over property to determine, at the latest possible date,
the manner of distribution of the property to the minor. If the cir-
cumstances at that time49 warrant the formalities of a guardianship,
then that vehicle can be chosen; if not, then a custodianship can be
used and the greater expenses and formalities of a guardianship can be
avoided.50
The third additional type of transfer makes it acceptable for a
personal representative, trustee, or conservator 51 to make such a
transfer even if the governing document fails to expressly authorize a
fiduciary to transfer property to a custodian for the minor. The trans-
fer is allowed if it is not prohibited by, or inconsistent with, the terms
of the instrument,5 2 provided the fiduciary determines that it would be
in the best interest of the minor to distribute property to him through
the use of a custodial account.53 Presumably, custodial accounts are
used for relatively small amounts of money or for short durations,
while guardianships are more desirable if large amounts of money are
involved or if the money is to be held for an extended time period.
This would give the minor the protection of court review afforded by
a guardianship 54 when the amount in question or other circumstances
justifies such protection. The Act recognizes this possibility by re-
quiring that court approval of the transfer to the custodial account be
obtained if there is no specific authorization for the transfer in any
governing document and the amount of the transfer exceeds $10,000
in value.55 In drafting a will or a trust, if the testator or grantor wants
to make certain that a minor beneficiary receives the protective mea-
sure of court supervision afforded by a guardianship, 6 then the in-
strument should eliminate the possibility of a transfer under this
provision by specifically stating that the fiduciary may not transfer
47. Id. § 5 at 162.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
49. Factors such as the amount of funds, the age of the minor beneficiary, or the absence
of a suitable custodian would be important considerations.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 74-82.
51. A "conservator" is defined for purposes of the UTMA as "a person appointed or
qualified by a court to act as general, limited, or temporary guardian of a minor's property or a
person legally authorized to perform substantially the same functions." UTMA § 1(4), 8A
U.L.A. at 157.
52. Id. § 6 at 163.
53. Id.; see id. § 6 comment at 163.
54. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
55. UTMA § 6(c), 8A U.L.A. at 163.
56. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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property to a custodian for a minor beneficiary. 57
Finally, the fourth additional type of transfer permits a person
owing a liquidated debt to a minor, or holding property of the minor,
to transfer property to a custodian if the minor has no conservator. 58
This provision would, for instance, allow a life insurance company
owing policy proceeds to a minor beneficiary59 to distribute the policy
proceeds to a custodian for the minor beneficiary. Since the transfer
would otherwise be made to the minor's conservator," this provision
could again dispense with the necessity of naming a guardian of the
property of the minor to receive the transfer. As noted above,6' the
Commissioners recognized that the added procedural safeguards of
the formal guardianship may be desired when the amount in question
is large; this type of transfer, therefore, is not permitted if the amount
of the transfer exceeds $10,000 in value.62
This liberalization of the types of permitted transfers of property
to custodial accounts and the resulting expansion in the class of per-
sons who may make transfers to custodianships should make this
form of ownership much more common. In addition, it could elimi-
nate the need in many cases for establishing a guardianship for the
benefit of the minor. In the future, such guardianships may be re-
stricted to situations in which the amount in question is substantial,
the use of a guardianship has been specifically required, or some other
c11rcumstances warn teadiin laeguards afforded%,% V" t
guardianship statutes.63
D. Permitted Custodians
Both versions of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act generally per-
mitted any adult, a trust company, or, in situations in which the sub-
ject of the gift was money, a broker to serve as custodian.6 However,
they also contained alternate language which was much more restric-
57. Such a statement would invoke the provisions of UTMA § 6(c)(ii), which prevents a
transfer under UTMA § 6 if it is "prohibited by, or inconsistent with provisions of the applica-
ble will, trust agreement, or other governing instrument." UTMA § 6(c)(ii), 8A U.L.A. at
163.
58. Id. § 7 at 164.
59. This assumes that no designation of a custodian for the minor beneficiary has been
made pursuant to the provisions discussed supra in text accompanying notes 43-46.
60. See supra note 51.
61. See supra text accompanying note 55.
62. UTMA § 7(c), 8A U.L.A. at 164.
63. See generally Moore, supra note 4, at 303-04; see also supra note 49; infra notes 83-97
and accompanying text.
64. 1956 UGMA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 416-17; 1966 UGMA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 344-45.
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tive in the scope of permitted custodians.6" Under this alternate lan-
guage, which was adopted in several states,66 only an adult member of
the minor's family, the minor's guardian, a bank or a trust company,
and, in cases of monetary transfers, a broker, could serve as custo-
dian.6 7 The minor was somewhat protected by these restrictions,
which again reflected that the Act was originally developed around
the concept of inter vivos gifts. 68 These restrictions assumed that a
family member generally would have the best interests of the minor at
heart, 69 a court would oversee a guardian's activities, 70 and the trust
company and broker would generally have sufficient assets against
which a damaged minor could recover.7'
The new Act deletes this restrictive alternate language and re-
tains the original provisions. These permit any adult, a trust company
as defined in the Act, or, for transfers of money, a broker as defned in
the Act to serve as custodian.72 This decision should be embraced, as
the restrictive language of the former Acts precluded the use of an
individual custodian, who would likely serve without compensation, if
there were no willing and able adult family members available.73
Although a custodian need not be a resident of the state in which a
custodianship is established, the property is located, or the transferor
65. See supra note 64.
66. Of the eight jurisdictions which retained the 1956 UGMA as of 1983, six had enacted
variations in the official text for § 2. 1956 UGMA § 2, 8A U.L.A. at 419-20. Of the forty-four
jurisdictions which adopted the 1966 UGMA in 1983, thirty-one of these jurisdictions adopted
language which varied from the official text in a manner which restricted the class of persons
who could serve as custodian in certain instances. 1966 UGMA § 2, 8A U.L.A. at 346-64.
67. 1956 UGMA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 416-17; 1966 UGMA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 344-45.
68. 1956 UGMA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. at 405-06; 1966 UGMA prefatory note, 8A
U.L.A. at 318; see also Day, supra note 8 at 41; Moore, supra note 4, at 298-301; Newman,
supra note 7, at 30-32.
69. This is probably generally true, but regrettably, this may not always be an accurate
assumption. See, e.g., In re Levy, 412 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sur. Ct. 1978), in which the court noted
The paucity of cases ... is itself a good indication that the purpose of the Gifts to
Minors Act generally, and in New York particularly, has been fulfilled. The vast
majority of children do not sue their parents or family members who are custodians.
The very looseness and liberality of the intra-family relationships encourages use of
the custodial device but unfortunately when there is a family breakdown the court
becomes involved.
Id. at 288.
70. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
71. These entities, defined in UTMA § 1(3), (17), 8A U.L.A. at 157 are regulated by the
states and the federal government for the protection of those depositing funds. This may still
be a problem, however. See infra note 208.
72. UTMA § 9(a), 8A U.L.A. at 165-66.
73. Id. § 9 comment at 167.
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or beneficiary resides,74 the custodian is subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in the state in which the custodianship is established.75 There-
fore, the minor has what is probably a convenient forum, in that he
may seek recovery in the courts of that state.76
The only qualifications under the new Act concerning which in-
dividuals may serve as custodians address the issue of whether the
transferor of property himself may serve as custodian.7 7 In recogni-
tion that there must be an objective means of determining whether a
completed transfer has in fact been made and whether the minor's
rights in the subject property are enforceable, 8 the Act permits a
transferor of property to serve as custodian only if the ownership of
the property is registered or recorded.79 Under the requirements of
the Act, if ownership of the property is not registered or recorded
then the transferor is not permitted to serve as custodian and the
property would have to be delivered to some other custodian.8" This
delivery would serve as the objective evidence of the completed trans-
fer. It is hoped that this requirement will eliminate any questions as
to whether a custodial account has been established,8' but this result
is far from certain.82
E. Fees and Expenses of the Custodian
Once the custodian accepts the property, he is given full rights of
ownership on behalf of the minor,83 and he may deal with the prop-
74. A sufficient nexus exists for the application of UTMA if either "the transferor, the
minor, or the custodian is a resident of [the jurisdiction] or the custodial property is located in
[the jurisdiction]." Id. § 2(a) at 160.
75. Id. § 2(b) at 160.
76. Id. This provision is not exclusive, however. The UTMA provides this forum to the
minor, but does not preclude the use of any other forum in which the minor may have a right
to bring an action. Id.
77. Id. § 9 at 165-67.
78. Upon the transfer of the property to the custodian, "the custodial property is indefea-
sibly vested in the minor." Id. § 11 (b) at 170.
79. Id. §§ 9(a)(1)(ii), 9(a)(3)(ii), 9(a)(6)(ii), 9(a)(7) at 165-66.
80. Id. § 9 comment at 167.
81. This has been a recurring problem under the two versions of the UGMA. See, e.g., In
re Marriage of Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984); In re
Marriage of Jacobs, 128 Cal. App. 3d 273, 180 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Ct. App. 1982); In re Marriage
of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Ct. App. 1977); Golden v. Golden, 434
So. 2d 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Gordon v. Gordon, 70 A.D.2d 86, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684
(App. 1978), aff'd 52 N.Y.2d 773, 417 N.E.2d 1009, 436 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980). The problem
does not yet appear to be solved, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes 145-55.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 157-68.
83. UTMA § 13(a), 8A U.L.A. at 173.
1987-88] UNIFORM TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT 351
erty without court order.8 4 The custodian is expected to discharge his
duties without supervision.85 No accounting need be filed with any
court or rendered to the minor or his representative unless required
by court order.86
These informal procedures are the key elements distinguishing
custodial accounts from formal guardianships. The custodian is not
subject to the strict court review of a guardian of the property of a
minor, 87 and he has substantially greater powers which may be exer-
cised without court approval.8 8 Similarly, the absence of the require-
ment of providing a regular accounting to the beneficiary
distinguishes the custodianship from a trust.8 9 While the custodian is
a fiduciary and is held to a fiduciary standard of care,90 he is not de-
scribed as a trustee.9 The relative informality of the custodial
method of holding property and the absence of these safeguards,
which exist with trusts and guardianships, are the primary reasons
why court approval of the use of a custodial account is required if
84. Id. § 14(a) at 174.
85. Id. §§ 14, 19 at 174, 180.
86. Id. § 19 at 180.
87. Under the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, for example, the
guardian (referred to in the Act as the conservator) must file an inventory with the court
within 90 days of his appointment, must provide accounting to the court upon termination of
the disability and at such other times as the court requires, and may have his powers granted
under the Act limited by court action. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEED-
INGS ACT §§ 2-317, -318, -323, -325, 8A U.L.A. 443, at 502, 503, 507, 513 (1983). The sub-
stance of these provisions are also promulgated as the UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-417, -418, -
423, -425, 8 U.L.A. 22, at 493, 498, 504 (1983).
88. Under the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, for example, the
guardian (referred to in the Act as the conservator) may have the powers which are granted
under the Act limited by court action. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEED-
INGS ACT, §§ 2-323, -325, 8A U.L.A. at 507, 513 (1983) also codified as UNIF. PROBATE
CODE, 8 U.L.A. §§ 5-423, -425, 8A U.L.A. at 498, 504 (1983). Some states are much more
restrictive than the uniform acts in the powers which the guardian may exercise without court
approval. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 744.441, .444 (1985), which delineate the powers which the
guardian may exercise without court approval and those which require court order.
89. Under the Uniform Probate Code, a trustee is required to account to a trust benefici-
ary "annually and on termination of the trust or change of the trustee." UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 7-303(c), 8 U.L.A. at 557. The variations among the states on this issue is further
discussed in G.T. BOGERT & G.G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 965-68 (rev. 2d ed.
1983 & Supp. 1986). This contrasts with the absence of any required court accounting under
the UTMA. UTMA § 19, 8A U.L.A. at 180.
90. UTMA § 12(b), 8A U.L.A. at 171. The standard of care for a custodian under
§ 12(b) is virtually identical to the standard established for trustees under UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 7-302, 8 U.L.A. at 555.
91. The custodian is not a trustee. For a discussion on the distinctions between trustees
and custodians under the 1956 and 1966 UGMA, see Report, supra note 4, at 985; Stubbs, The
Custodian as a Fiduciary, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 175 (1970). These distinctions in the duty of care are
eliminated in the UTMA. UTMA § 12(b) & comment, 8A U.L.A. at 171-72.
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there is no express provision for its use and the amount of the transfer
exceeds $10,000.92
Reflecting the fact that custodial accounts are intended to be op-
erated somewhat informally, often involve intrafamily transactions,
and should not involve any undue burden on a custodian, the custo-
dian is only given limited rights to fees.9 3 A transferor who is serving
as custodian may not be compensated for his service, 94 and a non-
transferor custodian may be compensated only if he so elects during a
calendar year.95  In an effort to prevent the potential transition of
gratuitous services into compensated services, 96 this right of a non-
transferor custodian to elect fees is noncumulative; if not asserted dur-
ing the calendar year, it lapses.9 7
F. The Support Obligation
One major area of controversy under the two versions of the Uni-
form Gifts to Minors Act was the use of custodial property for the
support of the minor beneficiary. 98 This problem arises in the con-
texts of dissolution of marriage99 and the probate of estates. 100 In ad-
dition, there are tax issues involving the use of custodial property for
this purpose.''
The new Act attempts to settle this problem in two ways. First,
the statutory standard for the use of the custodial property has been
changed from "the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the
minor"'1 2 to "the use and benefit of the minor."' 1 3 This change
92. UTMA § 6(c)(iii), 8A U.L.A. at 163; see supra text accompanying note 55.
93. Id. § 15 & comment at 175.
94. Id. § 15(b) & comment at 175.
95. Id.
96. If a family member were serving as custodian for a minor and the custodian was angry
with the minor at a time when distribution was required, it would be possible for him (in the
absence of any protective provisions) to assert a fee for services which he had rendered over the
past several years. He may have intended these services to have been gratuitous at the time
they were rendered, but the custodian could use his right to a fee as a means to vent his anger
with the beneficiary by reducing the amount of property available for distribution. This provi-
sion is designed to eliminate this possibility. Id. § 15 & comment at 175.
97. Id. § 15(b) at 175.
98. Mahoney, supra note 14, passim.
99. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wolfert, 42 Colo. App. 433, 598 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1979);
Weisbaum v. Weisbaum, 2 Conn. App. 270, 477 A.2d 690 (App. Ct. 1984); Butcher v.
Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. 523, 489 A.2d
764 (Super. Ct. 1985), appeal granted 509 Pa. 436, 502 A.2d 1231 (1985).
100. See, e.g., In re Zeigher's Estate, 95 Misc. 2d 230, 406 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sur. Ct. 1978); In
re Estate of Schwartz, 449 Pa. 112, 295 A.2d 600 (1972).
101. See sources cited supra note 14.
102. 1956 UGMA § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. at 422; 1966 UGMA § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. at 369.
1987-88] UNIFORM TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT
should eliminate the arguments under the former Acts that the custo-
dial property could only be used for the basic support needs of the
minor."° It should also give statutory expression to the concept that
the custodian may use the property for the minor beneficiary in the
same way that the minor could use the property himself if he owned it
directly. 105 As noted below,' °6 however, this goal is not yet achieved.
Second, specific statutory language added in the new Act states
that the use of custodial property for the benefit of the minor does not
affect any regular obligation to support the minor, 10 7 and courts
should not consider it as a substitution for any support obligation. 08
This language is designed to satisfy the requirements relating to the
tax effects of the transfer. 109 It also answers an issue which arose in
the marital dissolution context, in which one spouse claimed that
property previously conveyed to a custodianship for a minor child
should be considered by the court in determining the level of child
support payments to be established upon the dissolution of the mar-
riage of the parents. 110 The addition of this language should lessen, if
not eliminate,"' the force of this claim.
G. Liability to Third Parties
Along with the expansion of the types of property which may be
held in custodial accounts112 comes an increased exposure to liability
on the part of the custodian, the minor beneficiary, and the custodial
property itself. Since a minor generally does not have the legal capac-
ity to disclaim an interest in property, including a transfer to a custo-
dianship for his benefit," 13 he should not be subjected to any personal
liability resulting from a property interest being held in the custodial
account. The new Act protects the minor from such liability unless
he is determined to be personally at fault.1"' Similarly, recovery on
103. UTMA § 14(a), 8A U.L.A. at 174.
104. Id. § 14 comment at 174. See also, Mahoney, supra note 14, at 499-508, for a discus-
sion of possible interpretations of this language.
105. This is the concept behind the trust for minors established in I.R.C. § 2503(c) (1986);
R. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at 9.04(5)(a).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 183-94.
107. UTMA § 14(c), 8A U.L.A. at 174.
108. Id.
109. See sources cited supra note 14; UTMA § 14 comment 1, 8A U.L.A. at 174.
110. Mahoney, supra note 14; see cases cited supra note 99.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 183-94.
112. See supa notes 32-37.
113. UTMA § 17 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 177; I.R.C. § 2518 (1986); UNIF. DISCLAIMER
OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT § 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 86, 87 (1983).
114. UTMA § 17(c), 8A U.L.A. at 177.
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such a claim may only be made against the property held in the custo-
dial account; a creditor may not attach other property of the minor." 5
In recognition of his position as a fiduciary, and in order to pre-
vent the imposition of undue burdens against him, 1 6 a custodian is
not liable to third parties unless there has been some personal deroga-
tion of duty on his part."1 7 A claim may be asserted against the custo-
dial property in a proceeding brought against the custodian in his
custodial capacity.' 18
H. Termination
Despite the fact that the new Act defines a minor to be "an indi-
vidual who has not attained the age of 21 years,""I9 an age which was
chosen to conform with the definition of minority under the federal
gift tax law,' 20 the Act does not retain age twenty-one as the sole qual-
ifying age for the termination of the custodianship and the transfer of
the custodial property to the minor. Instead, the new Act provides
that the property is to be transferred to the minor when he attains
either the general age of majority or age twenty-one, depending upon
the nature of the original transfer of property to the custodian.' 2'
This means that the custodian could be required to distribute the
property to a beneficiary who still meets the definition of minority
under the Act.122 This possibility is logical when the circumstances
under which it would occur are considered.
If the property were originally transferred to the custodian as an
inter vivos gift or pursuant to specific authority contained in a will or
trust, 23 the Act provides that the custodianship will not terminate
until the minor attains age twenty-one. 124 In these types of transfers,
the custodian received the property through the express authority of
the grantor, who presumably was aware of the definitions contained
115. Id. § 17 comment at 177. Of course, if the minor is personally liable on a claim, id.
§ 17(c) at 177, the creditor may seize other property of the minor because of this personal
liability.
116. Id. § 17 comment at 177. It would be difficult to convince a person to serve as custo-
dian unless he were protected from individual liability for acts which were beyond his control.
Certainly, such convincing would involve a prohibitively higher fee being paid to the custodian
for his service.
117. Id. § 17(b) at 176, 177.
118. Id. § 17(a) at 176.
119. Id. § 1(11) at 157.
120. I.R.C. § 2503(c) (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
121. UTMA § 20, 8A U.L.A. at 181.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 126-32.
123. UTMA §§ 4, 5, 8A U.L.A. at 162; see supra text accompanying notes 42, 47-50.
124. UTMA § 20(1), 8A U.L.A. at 181.
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in the Act. It is thus appropriate that the property be held until age
twenty-one, the age of majority specified in the Act.'2 5
If the custodian receives the property from an obligor of the mi-
nor, 26 from someone who was holding property belonging to the mi-
nor,127 or from a personal representative, trustee, or conservator who
is acting without express authorization, 21 then the custodial property
is to be distributed when the minor attains the general age of major-
ity. 129 In these situations, the person conveying the property (who is
not the donor of the property) had the option of establishing a guardi-
anship for the benefit of the minor or delivering the property to the
custodian, and he had no express authorization from the donor of the
property as to which method should be used. 130  If a guardianship
were established, it would terminate when the minor ward attained
the general age of majority or for some other reason had the disabili-
ties of nonage removed. 13 1 The Commissioners determined that in
such a case the property should not be withheld from him beyond that
time due to a decision made by one who was acting without express
direction from the donor who created the property interest. 32
If the minor should die before attaining the age for distribution
of the property held by the custodian, the custodian is to transfer the
property to the estate of the deceased minor. 3' The property would
then generally pass according to the rules of intestate succession, 3
but the possibility exists that the minor could have the legal capacity
to make a will governing the disposition of the custodial property,
even though he was not entitled to possession of the property during
his lifetime. 135
125. Id. § 20 comment at 181.
126. Id. § 7(a) at 164.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 6 at 163.
129. Id. § 20(2) at 181.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 51-62.
131. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-210, -429, 8 U.L.A. 22 at 456, 508 (1983).
132. UTMA § 20 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 181.
133. Id. § 20 at 181.
134. The Uniform Probate Code establishes age 18 as the minimum age for having the
capacity to make a will. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 & comment, 8 U.L.A. at 102. With
the possible exception, therefore, of situations involving the death of a minor (as defined under
the UTMA) who has attained age 18 and has property held for his benefit in a custodial
account which terminates at age 21, the rules of intestate succession would apply because the
decedent did not have the capacity to make a will.
135. Id. If the custodianship had not terminated but the decedent had reached age 18 prior
to his demise, he would have had the capacity to make a will under the Uniform Probate Code,
with the result that he could have been able to control the testamentary disposition of the
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III. PRIOR TRANSFERS AND EXISTING CUSTODIANSHIPS
As a relief measure, and in an attempt to simplify and standard-
ize the law in the area of gifts to minors, 3 6 the Commissioners pro-
vided that the new Act is to apply to virtually all custodial
accounts. 137 This provision has the potential of making the Act appli-
cable to situations in which no previous authority existed. For exam-
ple, as noted above, two major changes from the terms of the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act are the expanded definition of custodial prop-
erty 138 and the increase in the types of permitted transfers.139 The Act
provides that a transfer of a type which was not authorized under the
former law"4 but was in fact made, will be validated, ab initio, if it is
authorized under the new Act.14' Similarly, if a property interest
which was not authorized under the former Act 14 2 had been con-
veyed, and the property interest meets the definitions contained in the
new law, 1 3 then the original transfer is validated by the new Act.'"
The provisions of the new Act apply to all custodianships created
under the prior law, except to the extent that such application would
impair constitutionally vested rights or would extend the duration of
a custodianship created under the former law.'45 With the exceptions
of these two areas, the new law will apply to an existing custodianship
without regard to the desires of those interested in the transaction and
regardless of any preference on their part to retain the applicability of
the former law.' 46 Thus, the provisions of the new Act will generally
apply to all custodianships, but a custodianship created under one of
the former uniform acts may terminate at an age younger than
twenty-one if the state had elected the earlier age in defining minority
under the prior law."'
Even though a previously established custodianship will be gov-
property held in the custodial account even though he had no right to demand possession of
the property while he was alive.
136. UTMA §§ 21-22 comments, 8A U.L.A. at 182-83.
137. Id. §§ 21-22 at 182-83.
138. See supra notes 32-37.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 38-63.
140. See supra notes 43-63.
141. UTMA § 22(a), 8A U.L.A. at 183.
142. See supra notes 32-37.
143. See supra notes 32-37.
144. UTMA § 22(a), 8A U.L.A. at 183.
145. Id. § 22(b) at 183.
146. Id. § 22 comment at 183. This creates another situation, therefore, in which a custo-
dian may be required to transfer custodial property to a beneficiary who is still a minor under
the UTMA. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31, 119-35.
147. UTMA § 22 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 183.
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erned by the terms of the new Act, the property held in the custodian-
ship may not be consolidated with property transferred after the
enactment of the new Act. The new Act permits property held
"under this Act" by the custodian for the benefit of a minor to be held
in a single custodianship,'48 even if received from different sources in
different types of transfers. It does not permit the commingling of
property received by the custodian under the jurisdiction's version of
the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or pursuant to another state's ver-
sion of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. 4 9 In these situations,
therefore, the custodian will be forced to hold any property so re-
ceived in a separate custodianship, 50 with separate accounting for
each custodianship.
The custodian may further be required to separately account for
various portions of the custodial property which he is holding.' 5 ' If
property is transferred to the custodian in different types of convey-
ances, the termination dates for the different property interests may
vary. 152 The custodian would be able to hold all of this property in a
single custodial account, but he would need to separately account for
these property interests so that they can be transferred to the minor at
the appropriate times."'
It must be noted that the new Act is unforgiving in one respect.
Former law provided that a custodial account may only be established
for a single minor beneficiary, with only one person serving as custo-
dian.'54 These limitations are retained in the new Act.'55 An at-
tempted conveyance which violated these provisions, therefore, would
not be cured by the enactment of the new Act, which is one of the
problems which remain under the Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act. 1 5 6
IV. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL RESOLUTION
Transfers and attempted transfers under the Uniform Gifts to
148. Id. § 10 at 169.
149. This results from the use of the phrase "under this Act" in § 10 of the UTMA, which
restricts the custodianship to holding property which was conveyed pursuant to the version of
the UTMA which was enacted in the jurisdiction. Id. § 10 & comment at 169-70.
150. Id.
151. Id. §§ 10, 20 comments at 169, 181.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 119-35.
153. UTMA §§ 10, 20 comments, 8A U.L.A. at 169-70, 181.
154. 1956 UGMA § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. at 417; 1966 UGMA § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. at 345.
155. UTMA § 10, 8A U.L.A. at 169.
156. See infra notes 170-81.
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Minors Act have not been a major source of litigation, 15 7 but the re-
ported cases do indicate the problem areas which exist in this area of
the law. In drafting the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, the Com-
missioners dealt with some of these problems, but their efforts do not
appear to have solved them all.
A. Establishing the Custodial Account
The procedures for establishing a custodial account are set forth
in the Act. 5 8 Decisions under the former Acts recognized that fol-
lowing these procedures is evidence that the grantor intended to in-
voke the custodianship provisions. 159 Despite the clear expression of
intent required by these provisions,' 6° courts have held that following
this procedure raises only a presumption;' 6 ' it is not conclusive evi-
dence that the grantor intended to establish a custodianship.'62
157. The few cases which have construed the two versions of the UGMA are noted in 8A
U.L.A. as annotations to the sections which were construed, and are further discussed in An-
notation, Construction and Effect of Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 50 A.L.R.3d 528-42 (1973 &
Supp. 1986).
158. UTMA § 9, 8A U.L.A. at 165.
159. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383
(Ct. App. 1984); In re Marriage of Jacobs, 128 Cal. App. 3d 273, 180 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Ct. App.
1982); In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Ct. App. 1977);
Golden v. Golden, 434 So. 2d 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Gordon v. Gordon, 70 A.D.2d
86, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 773, 417 N.E.2d 1009, 436 N.Y.S.2d
621 (1980).
160. Both versions of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act required that the transferor transfer
the property to the custodian in a manner which clearly indicated that a custodial account
existed. The Acts provided suggested language for this documentation, the details of which
depended on the nature of the property which was being transferred. In essence, the Acts
required that the transfer document indicate the name of the transferee "followed, in sub-
stance, by the words: 'as custodian for (name of minor) under the (name of enacting state)
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act'." 1956 UGMA § 2, 8A U.L.A. at 416-17; 1966 UGMA § 2, 8A
U.L.A. at 344-45. Substantial compliance with this language was sufficient. In Stephenson, for
example, the California Court determined that a designation of "Roy Stephenson as trustee for
Cathy L. Stephenson UGMA" was sufficient to invoke the custodianship provisions of the
UGMA. In re Marriage of Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1068 n.6, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383,
390 n.6 (Ct. App. 1984).
161. The test which is applied here is best summarized in Golden, which states that
Both courts held that even where a bank account is opened in a manner which satis-
fies the UGMA, there is no absolute bar to the introduction of extrinsic evidence to
show fraud or mistake, or to otherwise demonstrate a contrary intent. We are per-
suaded by those holdings, and adopt the same as the law of this case.
Golden v. Golden, 434 So. 2d 978, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing In re Marriage of
Jacobs, 128 Cal. App. 3d 273, 180 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Ct. App. 1982); Gordon v. Gordon, 70
A.D.2d 86, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 773, 417 N.E.2d 1009, 436
N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980)).
162. Once a court determines that a transfer has in fact been made pursuant to the Uni-
form Gifts to Minors Act, that transfer is irrevocable. 1956 UGMA § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. at 421;
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The new Act does not make any substantive changes in this
area. ' 63 The necessary mechanics are revised,' 64 but the Act contains
no clear statement that such a transfer is determinative of the intent
of the transferor to establish a custodianship. Because of the property
implications 65 and the resulting tax ramifications 66 of establishing a
custodial account, such a transfer should have a conclusive effect.
Although exceptions must be made to allow for cases of fraud or un-
due influence,167 any transfer purportedly invoking the provisions of
the Act should constitute conclusive evidence that the transferor had
such an intent. Similar provisions have been enacted in cases of joint
accounts, 68 and they also appear proper in this situation. The courts
have been reluctant to impose such restraints, 69 so the legislatures
should act so as to provide certainty to the area.
1966 UGMA § 3 (a), 8A U.L.A. at 366. The difficulty, however, is with the threshold question
of whether a transfer pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act has been made. As noted
supra in notes 146 & 148, extrinsic evidence has been permitted to show the intent of the
purported transferor in answering this threshold question.
163. UTMA § 9 & comment, 8A U.L.A. at 165-68.
164. The substance of the provisions for creating custodial property under the UTMA and
the purpose of the provisions of the Act are the same as those under the UGMA versions.
New provisions are inserted to provide a means of "handling the additional types of property
now subject to the Act" and the additional types of transfers which are now permitted. Id.
165. A transfer to a custodian under the UTMA "is irrevocable, and the custodial property
is indefeasibly vested in the minor." These rights of the minor in the property are subject,
however, to the "rights, powers, duties, and authority" of the custodian pursuant to the terms
of the UTMA. Id. § I1(b), 8A U.L.A. at 170.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
167. These equitable principles must be applied in any analysis of donative transfers,
whether the transfer is inter vivos or testamentary. These issues are most frequently analyzed
in the areas of testamentary transfers. See Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention: Grounds
for Upsetting Wills and Will Substitutes, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 32-46 (1984-85). The same
concepts, however, would apply to inter vivos transfers. "The grounds for setting aside inter
vivos transfers are basically the same as those for setting aside wills." Id. at 57.
168. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 665.063(l)(a) (1985), which states that opening an account in a
savings association as joint tenants "shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be con-
clusive evidence... of the intention of all of the parties to the account to vest title to such
account and the additions thereto in such survivor or survivors." The Florida Statutes create a
different presumption for joint accounts in banks and trust companies, stating that the pre-
sumption of survivorship "may be overcome only by proof of fraud or undue influence or clear
and convincing proof of a contrary intent." FLA. STAT. § 658.56(2) (1985).
Florida, therefore, maintains the unjustifiable position that the character of the depository
institution determines the level of the presumption of intent to establish a joint tenancy. This
distinction was determined to be constitutional in a questionable decision, In re Estate of
Gainer, 466 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1985). The concept that the titling of property in a manner
which raises the legal issue of the right of survivorship is conclusive in establishing that right,
however, is not unusual. See 4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
616 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
169. See supra note 162.
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B. Only One Beneficiary and One Custodian
Both the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act and the two versions
of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act provide that there may be only
one minor beneficiary of a custodianship and only one custodian of
the account. 170 These restrictions are strictly historical, carried over
from the similar provisions contained in the Model Act, 17 ' but they
have been adopted in virtually every jurisdiction. 72 Such restrictions
do achieve the laudable goal of simplicity, 173 but they also create a
trap for the unwary transferors and intermediaries who are not famil-
iar with them. There is no reported litigation involving attempted
transfers violating these restrictions.' 74 If faced with such an issue, a
court would be forced either to void the transfer on the grounds that
it violated the Act or to allow it under the doctrine of substantial
compliance or as a statutory trust or guardianship. Reliance on these
theories to uphold the transfer would open new issues, however, since
most states require that accountings be provided to a court or to bene-
ficiaries in the cases of guardianships or trusts. 75  As these require-
170. 1956 UGMA § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. at 417; 1966 UGMA § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. at 345;
UTMA § 10, 8A U.L.A. at 169.
171. By implication, the Model Act restricted its application to a single beneficiary and a
single custodian. 1956 UGMA § 2 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 419.
172. There is some variation in the language of the statutes enacted in the various jurisdic-
tions, but the substance of the single beneficiary/single custodian restriction is maintained,
with the following exceptions: Nevada omits this section in its adoption of the UTMA, NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 167.010-. 100 (1986), and Virginia omits the phrase "and only one person may
be the custodian" in its adoption of the 1966 UGMA. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-27(b) (1985).
173. The single beneficiary aspect of the rule can be justified on the basis that it eliminates
the problems of allocating income, expenses and the ownership of property among account
beneficiaries, and the problem of making partial distribution of account proceeds when one of
the beneficiaries reaches the appropriate age for distribution. This is handled on a regular basis
by trustees who have more than one trust beneficiary, but the UTMA is not designed for such
sophisticated applications. Stubbs, supra note 91, at 188.
The single custodian rule is more difficult to justify. While it does remove the possible
problem of obtaining the signatures of more than one custodian in order to take action related
to the custodial property, it also creates the problem of having to name a successor custodian
in the event of the demise of the original custodian. See UTMA § 18, 8A ULA. at 177-78;
Day, supra note 8, at 49; Newman, supra note 7, at 33-35; Report, supra note 4, at 988.
174. It is possible that any problems with these requirements which were discovered would
be solved by the parties involved, without resort to court action. The fact that a problem arose
would indicate that a mistake was made on the part of the transferor, the custodian, or the
entity which is holding the property and which quite possibly promoted the custodial concept.
As noted infra in the text accompanying notes 175-82 the correction of an error of this nature
does involve legal issues, and self-help is not the appropriate remedy to the problem, but self-
help is one solution which as a practical matter would be welcomed and perhaps even initiated
by the depository holding the funds. It quite possibly, therefore, would never come to the
attention of an attorney.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
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ments are absent from the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 176 the
custodian (or guardian or trustee) would likely have violated the pro-
visions of the other statutes which the courts would be relying on to
uphold the transfer.
177
Since the Uniform Act is designed to operate without formal re-
view 7 8 and is often promoted and used by those who have no legal
background, it seems desirable to make it as easy as possible for po-
tential transferors to take advantage of the statutory provisions.1 79 It
would be useful, therefore, to insert into the Act a relief provision to
the effect that if a transfer to a custodian is attempted but inadver-
tently fails for a technical reason, such as naming more than one mi-
nor beneficiary or more than one custodian,1 80 then the technical
defect will be cured by the court upon application of an interested
party. If more than one beneficiary were named, for example, the
court could partition the property between the minor beneficiaries. If
more than one custodian were appointed, the court could determine
which of the named parties should serve as custodian. Such a relief
provision would clarify the present uncertainty and would be superior
to the present risk of having the transfer fail because of an inadvertent
violation of the statute, 181 or even because of an intentional violation
in an attempt to obtain some imagined advantage.182 The person who
bears the greatest potential loss under the current statutory provisions
is the minor beneficiary, who is the most innocent of the involved
parties.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
177. This violation would be of a technical nature, and should not be the source of liability
to the custodian holding the funds, regardless of whether the court classifies him as a guardian
of the property of the minor or as a trustee for the benefit of the minor. If the court cares to
classify the purported custodian as a guardian or as a trustee, then it would be appropriate for
the court to require compliance with the statutory provisions governing a guardianship or a
trust, beginning with the rendition of the court's order.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
179. Report, supra note 4, at 991.
180. This is forbidden under the language of the UTMA and both versions of the UGMA.
See supra note 170, and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 172-74.
182. A person might think, for instance, that he could establish a custodial account in the
name of his two children, have his children pay the tax which is owed on the income of the
custodial account, see supra note 14, and then recover the property before the beneficiaries
reach the age for required distribution. This would be done either without the children's
knowledge that the account ever existed or under the theory that the transfer was void because
it violated the one beneficiary/one custodian rule. This theory is, of course, without merit, but
concern over these types of transactions has been expressed. Day, supra note 8, at 50; Moore,
supra note 4, at 310; Newman, supra note 7, at 43-45; Note, supra note 4, at 1481-82.
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C. The Support Obligation
One of the major problems under the former Act was the ques-
tion of whether property held in a custodial account should be consid-
ered in determining the support of the minor beneficiary. 183 Although
this issue has tax ramifications,"8 4 they only become relevant if the
property is in fact used for this purpose.' 85 The question thus arose
mainly in the marital dissolution context 8 6 when determining the
support obligations of a noncustodial divorced parent.
The Commissioners have attempted to solve this problem by stat-
ing that an action taken in a custodial account is "in addition to, not
in substitution for, and does not affect any obligation of a person to
support the minor."'8 7 This provision does seem to solve the problem
for tax purposes, in that it severs the chain which would tie either the
transfer of the property to the custodian, or its use by the custodian
on behalf of the minor, back to the transferor.88 It does not, how-
ever, solve the problem from the property law viewpoint. The Act
itself does not give the minor or the custodian any right to force the
person obligated to support the minor to do so, as opposed to having
to expend custodial property for this support. 89 The Act represents a
compromise on this issue,' 90 and it is one which unfortunately works
against the best interests of the minor. Although the minor may have
other available means of enforcing this right to support,"', it is unfor-
tunate that the issue of providing support for a minor under this Act
has been subrogated to concerns for maintaining simplicity. 9 The
specific assertion of a cause of action would not be difficult, I" particu-
183. See supra text accompanying notes 98-111.
184. See sources cited supra note 14.
185. See sources cited supra note 14.
186. See cases cited supra note 99.
187. UTMA § 14(c), 8A U.L.A. at 174.
188. See sources cited supra note 14.
189. UTMA § 14 comment, 8A U.L.A. at 174.
190. Id. The ambiguity which existed under the two versions of the UGMA is discussed in
Mahoney, supra note 14.
191. Some jurisdictions permit a child to bring an action against his parent to enforce the
parent's obligation to support the child. McQuade v. McQuade, 145 Colo. 218, 358 P.2d 470
(1960); Annotation, Maintenance of Suit by Child, Independently of Statute, against Parent for
Support, 13 A.L.R.2D 1142 (1950), as cited in H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
§ 6.3 (1968).
192. The Commissioners recognized that one of the possibilities on this issue would be to
provide that the use of custodial property for the support of the minor "gives rise to a cause of
action by the minor against his parent to the extent that custodial property or income is so
used," but this possibility was rejected "as too cumbersome." UTMA § 14 comment, 8A
U.L.A. at 174.
193. Despite the tenor of the Official Comment, id., it would not appear to be too cumber-
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larly when compared to the potential benefit granted to the minor.' 94
Such a cause of action could be accompanied by a limitations period
commencing when the minor reaches the age of majority'95 (as de-
fined in the new Act) so as to reduce any burden on the custodian.
Such a provision is warranted.
D. Old Property, New Rules?
As noted above, 196 the new Act provides that its terms will apply
to existing custodianships which were established under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act, with the exceptions of those changes which
would impair constitutionally vested rights or extend the duration of
a custodianship created under the former Act. 97 This provision is
desirable, in that it results in current law being applied to all custodi-
anships except for the limited circumstances listed above. '98 The pro-
vision does have some side effects, however, which may run counter
to the intent of the transferor in establishing the custodial account or
choosing the custodian.
Under the two versions of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, the
property which could be transferred to the custodian 99 and the man-
ner in which it could be transferred to him2 were very limited.
Under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, on the other hand, any
interest in property may be transferred to the custodian or held by
him.2 O' It is not unrealistic to imagine that a transferor of property to
a custodian under one of the versions of the former Act may have
chosen that person as custodian with the understanding that his op-
tions in dealing with the custodial property would be limited. If the
custodian had broader powers, and were able to receive additional
property from a variety of other sources, as is the case under the new
some to insert a clause stating that the use of custodial property by the custodian for the
support of the minor beneficiary gives the minor a cause of action against the person obligated
to provide such support, which action may be brought within (for example) one year of his
reaching the age of majority under the Act.
194. To deny this benefit is to require, in essence, that the minor support himself during his
minority with what is, under the Act, his own property. See infra note 104.
195. See supra note 193.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 136-56.
197. UTMA § 22(b), 8A U.L.A. at 183.
198. The Commissioners recognized that "it will be more orderly to subject gifts or other
transfers under the prior Act to the procedures of this Act, rather than to keep both Acts in
force." Id. § 22 comment at 183.
199. See supra note 32.
200. See sources cited supra note 38.
201. See supra note 36.
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Act,2 °2 then the transferor may have chosen a different custodian or
used a trust or guardianship vehicle in order to give additional protec-
tion to the minor beneficiary.20 3 Once the transfer was made the
transferor lost control over the custodian and the property, 204 so this
change in the law means that the custodian now has much broader
powers than the transferor might have envisioned or desired.
The new Act could have protected the transferor from this possi-
bility by providing that the former law would apply to all custodian-
ships established pursuant to its provisions, but the Commissioners
felt that concerns for uniformity and simplicity outweighed the need
to protect the transferor on this matter. 2 5  This is an appropriate
decision, particularly when the fiduciary standard of care for dealing
with custodial property is considered. 20 6  The minor is protected to
the extent of having a cause of action against a custodian who makes
imprudent investments with custodial property. 207 This protection
may be illusory,20 8 but the basic goals of the Act appear to be met
with this balancing of interests.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 43-62.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91. As discussed there, there is a difference in
the levels of supervision and court review which are provided to a guardianship, a trust, or a
custodianship. A transferor would presumably recognize these distinctions, and use the vehi-
cle which he fclt best served his purposes under the law as it existed at that time. This is one of
the reasons for the distinction between the UTMA rules governing transfers to a custodianship
when authorization has been granted in the governing instrument and those rules which apply
when no such authorization is specifically set forth. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
204. The effect of a transfer under the UGMA was to give to the minor "indefeasibly
vested legal title to the security or money given." 1956 UGMA § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. at 421; 1966
UGMA § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. at 366. The official text of the UTMA retains this concept, but
revises the official language to read "the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the mi-
nor." UTMA § 1 (b), 8A U.L.A. at 170. The effect of such a transfer to a custodian would be
to remove any control which the transferor had over the property and its investment, and
transfer those rights to the custodian.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 136-56.
206. Although a custodian "has all the rights, powers and authority over custodial prop-
erty that unmarried adult owners have over their own property," in dealing with this property
"a custodian shall observe the standard of care that would be observed by a prudent person
dealing with the property of another, and is not limited by any other statute restricting invest-
ments by fiduciaries." UTMA §§ 13(a), 12(b), 8A U.L.A. at 173, 171. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 90-91.
207. See, e.g., In re Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977), in
which the beneficiaries of an estate recovered damages in excess of $15,000,000 against the
executors of the estate of Mark Rothko. See also G.T. BOGERT & G.G. BOGERT, supra note
89, § 543(V), at 862.
208. The trustee may be judgment-proof, so that the beneficiary will be unable to recover
any damages.
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V. SUJMMARY
The Uniform Transfers to Minors Act should serve to increase
the utility of custodial accounts for the benefit of minors, and the
changes which it brings to this area of the law should be welcomed.
The Act does not solve all of the problems which were experienced
under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, and statutory revisions are
warranted in the areas of establishing the transferor's intent, 20 9 pro-
viding for the support rights of the minor, 210 and providing for inad-
vertent violations of the terms of the Act.21" '
The new Act does, however, make custodial accounts much
more likely to be used as alternatives to the more expensive and cum-
bersome guardianship or trust procedures. It clarifies the law in this
area and should provide a welcome return to uniformity. In doing so,
the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act represents a major step forward
in promoting the transfer of property to a minor.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 158-69.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 183-95.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 170-82.

